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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 78-2-2(4), whereby the Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case to the
Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
NATURE OF CASE
Defendants Chase Manhatten Bank, N.A. and Consolidated Oil & Transportation
Company, Inc., were dismissed by the trial court on Summary Judgment and Lack of
Jurisdiction respectively. The orders became final on December 15,2000, when an
order dismissing Appellant's claim with prejudice against all remaining parties was
entered, by the Honorable A Lynn Payne, Eighth District Court in and for Uintah County,
State of Utah.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on January 11, 2001.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err infindingthat there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Chase Manhatten Bank was a
principal/agent of Landmark Petroleum/ Westcourt and that
Chase Manhatten was entitled to judgment as a matter of law?
Standard of Review: The Court reviews a dismissal on Summary Judgment for
Correctness. Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. URCP Rule 56(c). As a question of law, entitlement to summary judgment
is reviewed for correctness. K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah
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1994). " 'We determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no
disputed issues of material fact.'" Id. (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149,151
(Utah 1989) (citation omitted)). Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598
(Utah App. 1995).
2. Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law that
Consolidated Oil and Transportation lacked minimum contacts
with the State of Utah so as to preclude a finding of long arm
jurisdiction?
Standard of Review: The court reviews jurisdictional decisions for correctness.
Where, as here, "a pretrial jurisdictional decision has been made on documentary
evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only legal questions that are
reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mackt 838P.2d
1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v. American Soc 'y ofPlastic &
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), Starways Inc. v. Curry,
1999 WL 308573 (Utah 1999).
3. Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law that
Consolidated Oil and Transportation, Inc. is not doing business
within the State of Utah so as to preclude a finding of general
jurisdiction?
Standard of Review: The court reviews jurisdictional decision for correctness.
Where, as here, "a pretrial jurisdictional decision has been made on documentary
evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only legal questions that are
reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mack, 838P.2d
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1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v. American Soc y of Plastic &
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), Starways Inc. v. Curry,
1999 WL 308573 (Utah 1999).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
URCP 56(c)
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(4)
FRCP Rule 12

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the latter part of 1994 and early 1995, Appellant was employed by Adler
Hot Oil Service ("ADLER") as a hot oil truck driver. Adler was engaged in the business
of contracting with other companies for the use of its hot oil trucks. In September, 1994,
and again in February, 1995, Adler was contacted telephonically by Shirley Heber, a
principle of Consolidated Oil and Transportation, Inc. ("CTCI"). Ms. Hebert contracted
with Adler to perform a hot oil procedure on a storage tank at a refinery in Fruita,
Colorado. (Heiner deposition, P. 25-26)
The hot oil procedure was completed in September, 1994, as contracted and
invoices were sent by Adler, in Vernal, Utah, to CTCI. CTCI neglected to pay the
invoices and Adler filed a complaint against CTCI in the District Court in Vernal, Utah.
CTCI filed its answer, admitting jurisdiction.
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CTCI owned oil in a storage tank, at a refinery, in Fruita, Colorado, which was
too thick to remove from the tank. CTCI contracted with Adler to use a hot oil truck to
pump heated oil into the storage tank until the oil in the storage tank became hot enough
to liquify so that it could be removed from the storage tank and sold as product.
(Addendum "J" Heiner deposition p. 25-34) On or about February 27, 1995, the
Appellant was injured when performing duties for Adler, required under the contract
between Adler and CTCI. The Appellant was injured when a coupling came loose and
Appellant was sprayed with hot oil, causing first degree burns over 50% of his body.
(Addendum "I" Second Amended Complaint, paragraphs 10-22)
CTCI maintains a web site that solicits business in the State of Utah. The site
provides detailed factual information about CTCI and requests that the Web site user
contact CTCI.
In addition to the web site, CTCI communicates over the Wed to residents of Utah
through electronic communication. CTCI purchases products and arranges for shipping
the products out of Utah (R. 668-679, P.9, Tf2, "CTCI's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion To Dismiss")
It is undisputed that Chase Manhatten Bank's ("Chase") involvement as a
security holder of Landmark Petroleum, Inc., ("Landmark") assets began as a lender, as
evidenced by the 1992 Amended Restated Credit Agreement ("Amended Credit
Agreement") (Addendum "A").
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In 1994, the relationship between Chase and Landmark changed. Chase and
Landmark agreed that the refinery should be closed. Chase and Landmark agreed that
Defendant Westcourt Management, Inc., ("Westcourt") would purchase some of the
assets and maintain and sell the rest. In order to accomplish this, contracts were entered
into between Chase, Landmark and Westcourt. (Addendum "B" Marketing Agreement)
(Addendum "C", Asset Purchase Agreement) (Addendum "D", Consent and Agreement),
(Addendum "E", Management Agreement).
Richard Means, ("Means") was an employee of the refinery, whose duties
included maintaining the assets of the refinery on behalf of Westcourt and Chase.
(Addendum "F", Means depo. P. 42, lines 14-16) Because Westcourt wanted to avoid the
expense of Means' payroll, Chase paid Means' wages. (Addendum "F" Means depo. P.
39, lines 8-9). As a result of Appellant's injuries, Appellant filed an amended complaint
naming, among other defendants, Chase Manhatten Bank, N.A. ("CHASE") and
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., as parties. (Addendum "I" Second Amended Complaint)
Appellant specifically alleged that Chase incurred liability as an owner/operator and/or
employer of the refinery because it was involved in the day-to-day operations and control
of the refinery. Both parties entered their appearances and discovery was conducted over
the course of several years.
In or about October, 1999, the Appellant was made aware that Consolidated Oil &
Gas, Inc., was the wrong defendant and moved the court to dismiss them. On or about
November 11, 1999, the Appellant filed his motion and order to add (" CTCI") and
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CTCI was served. Appellant specifically alleged that CTCI incurred liability as a
contractor of Adler Hot Oil Service by being involved in a refinery that worked with
"ultra-hazardous" activities and because it instructed plaintiff to utilize inherently unsafe
procedures.
On or about February 28, 2000, Chase brought a Motion for Summary Judgment
claiming that it was nothing more than a lender and did not assume sufficient control of
the operations of the refinery to become a principal with liability for the acts and
transactions of the refinery. On or about July 11, 2000, the District court entered an order
granting Chase's Motion For Summary Judgment. (Addendum "G" and Addendum "K")
On or about January 19, 2000, CTCI brought a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction claiming that it was/is a Colorado Corporation and had no business dealings
and/or minimum contacts with the State of Utah and did not transact any business in the
State of Utah which would allow Utah to have personal or specific jurisdiction. On or
about April 18, 2000, the District Court entered its order granting CTCFs Motion To
Dismiss For Lack Of Jurisdiction. (Addendum "H" and Addendum "L")
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L
The Appellant argues that pursuant to the terms of (Addendum "B", "C", "D" and
"E") and in practice, Chase stepped out of the role of a lender and became a principal in
the day to day operations of the refinery. Appellant argues that in so doing, chase
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assumed the role of manager and/or operator of the refinery and thus, was liable for the
negligence of the refinery causing the accident involving the Appellant.
2&3
The Appellant argues that CTCI, by using a web site to transact business in Utah
it is present in Utah for purposes of general jurisdiction. Appellant also argues that since
CTCI engaged in the transaction of business in Utah, i.e., entering into the contract with
Adler, and the fact that injuries to Appellant arose out the business activity, Utah has
specific jurisdiction over CTCI.
ARGUMENT

Did the trial court err infindingthat there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Chase Manhatten was a principal/agent of
Landmark Petroleum and that Chase Manhatten was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law?
A.

A lender, which is a secured creditor may, by its acts, become a
principal of the debtor.

The law is clear that a lender, which is a secured creditor, may, by its acts,
become a principal of the debtor. This fundamental rule of law is set fDrth in the
American Law Restatement ofAgency, section 14(0) which states the following.
Security Holder Becoming a Principal
A creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the mutual
benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a principal, with liability
for the acts and transactions of the debtor in connection with the business.
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There is no Utah case which applies this section of the restatement of
agency. Other courts, however, have used the above cited law to find liability on the part
of lending institutions, see, Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp., v. Leucadia, Inc., 474 N.Y.S. 2d
79 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1984). In Plymouth the court held that due to the degree of control
exercised by a second mortgagee over the mortgagor's operation, the mortgagor, who
assigned to the second mortgages all of the rents and profits derived from the operation of
the property became second mortgagee's agent, see also, Save Way Oil Company, Inc. v.
Mehlman, 496 N.Y.S.2d 537 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1985). In Save Way Oil Company, the court
found, in an action to recover damages for goods had and received against a bank, as a
mortgagee, an issue of fact existed as to whether the conduct of opening a bank account
as an "agency account" and the use of a checks drawn thereon for fuel oil payments,
created the appearance of apparent authority in the management firm to incur
expenditures for fuel oil for mortgaged premises on behalf of the bank.
B. Chase, by exercising control over the Landmark/Westcourt, beyond that
of a reasonable debtor, became a principal of Landmark/Westcourt.

Chase's involvement with Landmark began as a lender as evidenced by the 1992
Amended Restated Credit Agreement. (Addendum "A") It is undisputed that as a part
of the loan, Chase became a security holder of Landmark's assets.
In 1994, the relationship between Chase and Landmark changed. Chase and
Landmark agreed that the refinery should be closed. Chase and Landmark agreed that
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Defendant Westcourt would purchase some of the assets and manage and sell the rest. In
order to accomplish this, contracts were entered into between Chase, Landmark and
Westcourt. (Addendum "B", "C", "D" & "E").
As a part of the agreements between Chase, Landmark and Westcourt, Chase
exerted much more control and made virtually all of the decision regarding the refinery.
[Addendum "B"].
The District Court made a finding that Chase did not have veto power over the
sale of the assets of Landmark, but had power to agree or disagree. However, the plain
language of the Marketing Agreement states that Westcourt was required to establish a
bank account, with respect to which Chase would have the sole right to make
withdrawals. (Addendum "B" Tf 2.4(a)). All monies received from the sale of the assets
were to go into said account. (Addendum "B" ^f 2.4(a)) Westcourt was required to
establish another account at Chase to which Chase had discretion to transfer money, upon
request of Westcourt, for, among other things, maintenance of the assets. (Addendum
"B" U 2.4(b)). In order to receive money from Chase for daily expenses, Westcourt had
to make a request in writing. (Addendum "B" 2.4(b)(ii)). If Chase and Westcourt
disagreed on the amount to deducted for the monthly expenses, the matter was to be
settled by their accounting firm. (Addendum "B" ^ 2.5) The Appellant argues that if
Chase had the power to approve or disapprove of the monthly expenses, it necessarily
had control of the day to day operations.
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The District Coin 1 ,HM» luuiiti llul s\ lulr < lust ilid exercise some control over the
assets of Westcourt, it did so as a lender, to protect them. (Addendum "G") It is true (hat
Chase w us limetesiot in pimn

K!IJ»

the assets oi \\ estcourt because of its interest in the

assets. However, Chase stepped beyond what an ordinary lender w,

)

l>i oleel the assets* Pursuant to agreement with Chase, Westcourt could not complete any
sale of any Landmark asset greater than $250,000.00 without lirsl mlomim^ I 'haso of
the terms of the sale and allowing Chase the right to object. If Chase objected, then
Westcourt/Landmark could not piorml wilh (he sulr (Addendum "B"" I'age i 1 ! :"!. M,a)
(c)).
Wesiroun nr:^ M'qim'ni >n Tliast" I « have monthly meetings with Chase and
Landmark to discuss projected expenses. Thereafter, Chase would disburse from
Landmark's bank account to Westcourt's bank account in the amount of the projected
monthly expense. Chase, however, kept its right to object to ,iii \ sale expenses cuvujmg
$2,500 00 Chase did not require Landmark's consent to exercise this veto power of sales
expenses. (Addendum "B" Page 5, ^| (m), page <>, )\ (ii))
Chase required Westcourt to provide it a written breakdown of all monthly sales
expenses. (Ex 10, page 8, paragraph 1 2( a) I
Chase retained the right to fire Westcourt as the party marketing Landmark asset.
Specifically,!^

Marketing agreement with Westcourt,

thereby removing Westcourt as the sales agent of Landmark's assets. (Addendum
•page LMItV^t
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Another indication of the very tight control that Chase maintained over Westcourt
and Landmark is exhibited by the fact that Chase became a shareholder of
Landmark.(Addendum "F" Means Depo. Pages 16 &41)
It is also significant that Chase was paying the plant manger, Richard Means'
wages. Richard Means' duties at the refinery included maintaining the assets of the
refinery on behalf of Westcourt and Chase. [Addendum "F" Mean deposition, p. 42, line
14-16]. Westcourt wished to avoid keeping Mr. Means as a manager of the refinery
because of the added expense. However, Chase agreed to put Mr. Means on the
Westcourt payroll. (Addendum "F" Means deposition, p.39, lines 8-9,
"An agency relationship is afiduciaryrelation which resultsfromthe
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act." See Continental Bank &
Trust Co. v. Taylor, 384 P.2d 796 (Utah 1963) quoting American Law Institute
Restatement ofAgency 2d, Section 1.
It was Chase's decision to keep Mr. Means' working at the refinery. Chase was
paying for his wages by reimbursing Westcourt. Mr. Means' duties were performed on
behalf of Chase. Chase controlled his employment. It had the total discretion to sign
checks from Landmark's account to reimburse Westcourt. Mr. Means could not work at
the refinery without the consent and control of Chase. Certainly, Mr. Means was an
agent of Chase and Chase should be liable for his negligent acts at the refinery.
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Chase luul ronipli'lf nnili1"1 <n </» "I r u'liiN'is subsequent to i^.M Chase could
terminate Westcourt and/or Richard Means. Chase was the only party that could sign on
I jiitlniait'* kink .ttioiiiil .iiiil luil complete discretion on funds. The facts clearly
support a finding that Chase was the principal of Landmark and that Richard Means was
an agent of Chase.
2
Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law that
Consolidated Oil and Transportation lacked minimum
contacts within the State of Utah so as to preclude a finding of
long arm jurisdiction?
Through its business contact with Utah, with regard to both the subject transaction
and by advertising and doing business in I Huh, thi'i'c wnv sulliiinit conlads loi I Mall to
have jurisdiction over CTCI.
A.

For purposes of CTCFs Motion to Dismiss, Appellant need only a
prime facie showing of jurisdiction.

• There ai e three avenues a\ ailable in which to determine jurisdiction. The Court
may determine jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit discovery or hold an evidentiary
hearing. Appellee has submitted the issue of jurisdiction to the District Court by
affidavit. The Utah Supreme court dealt with such a case in Anderson i 1 mem i in
Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990). In Anderson,
the Court adopted rule 12 ofthe Federal Rules off'", 'I I'loceduu *oi iisr h\ Utah State
Courts and stated the following:

The approach taken by the federal courts is motivated by concern for
flexibility, judicial economy, and preservation of substantial rights. In the
federal court's discretion, under rule 12 it may determine jurisdiction on
affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing. If it
proceeds on documentary evidence alone (i.e., the first two methods), the
Appellant is only required to make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction. The Appellant's factual allegations are accepted as true
unless specifically controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by
depositions, but any disputes in the documentary evidence are resolved in
the Appellant's favor. The trial court must not weigh the evidence unless
a hearing is held.
Appellant, therefore, needed to only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.
Such a burden is defined as "relatively slight". See, Pruco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Towers,
39 F.Supp.2d 1320 (D.Utah 1999) footnote 4.
B. CTCI is using its web site to transact business in the State of Utah and is
therefore present in Utah for purposes of general jurisdiction.
The Internet has provided for a new area of law in dealing with jurisdiction. The
law applying personal jurisdiction standards to the Internet is set forth in Zippo Mfg. Co..
v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp 1119 (W.D.Pa. 1997). This law was adopted by
Utah courts in Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F.Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah
1998) and again in PurCo Fleet Services, Inc. v. Towers, 38 F.Supp. 2d 1320 ( D.Utah
1999). Specifically, Judge David Sam, in the Patriot case, p. 1324, quoted the following
language from the Zippo case.
.. .However, current case law reveals three general categories along
a "sliding scale" for evaluating jurisdiction. Id. First, personal jurisdiction
is established when "a defendant clearly does business over the Internet",
such as entering into contracts which require the "knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet." Id, (quoting Zippo, 952
F.Supp. at 1123-24). Second, exercising personal jurisdiction is not
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appropriate when the Internet use involves "[a] passive Web site that does
little more than make information available to those who are interested in
it" Id. (quoting, Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1123-24). Under these
circumstances, "a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet
Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions." Id.
(quoting, Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1123-24). Third, a middle category
encompasses "interactive Web sites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer.: Id. (quoting, Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at
1123-24). Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate depends
upon the "level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site." Id. (quoting, Zippo, 952
F.Supp. at 1123-24)
(leai I \,» Mi

H i ions place them in the first category. CTCI has posted a

lengthy and detailed Web site that is more than a passive M\\ rrhsrinrni i "TC "I \\a \ ides
seven pages of facts regarding its company and requests that a Utah visitor of the Web
site contact them. (See Plaintiffs Memorandum In "I ippoMlmn In Motion lo Dismiss, R.
817-858). In addition, CTCI admits in its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction that it is engaged in spot transactions with Utah companies and
uses electronic communications through the Web to transact business in the State
Utah. (Sec Defendant «, Meinniiinduiii I ti Support of Motion To Dismiss, R.668-679).
CTCI, through its use of the Web, is present in Utah and the Eighth I >istn< i \ \ m
\\t\h general mi IMIII lion over this defendant.

1
The Eight District Court has specific jurisdiction over CTCI since
CTCI has engaged in the transaction of business within this state and
the injuries to Appellant arose out of the business activity.
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The Federal District Court of Utah in Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F.Supp.
1123 (D.Utah 1986) explained the analysis to be used in determining whether specific
jurisdiction should be exercised.
In Fletcher, an oral contract was entered into between Appellant and defendant in
which Appellant agreed to supply drilling mud to the defendant in Nevada. The contract
was entered into over the telephone. Defendant had no other contract with Utah. The
Utah court found jurisdiction to exist by applying a three step analysis.
The court determined that Defendant Fletcher had transacted business in Utah.
The court determined that a defendant need not be physically present in the State of Utah
to be transacting business in Utah. The act of Defendant Fletcher in engaging in a
telephone call to enter into an oral contract satisfied the requirement of showing that
Defendant was transacting business in the State of Utah.
The court's second part of its analysis found that the Appellant's claim arose out
of its activity within the State of Utah. In finding that the claim arose out of the activity
within Utah, the court stated the following:
The second step in a jurisdictional analysis is to determine whether
Nova Mud's claim arises out o/Fletcher's activity within Utah. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,251, 78 S.Ct. 1228,1238,2 L.Ed. 1283 (1958)...
In this case both Nova Mud's claim for breach of contract and claim for
common lawfrauddirectly relate to Fletcher's activity of calling and
requesting services from a Utah corporation. The Hanson test is clearly
met.
Id At 1126.
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The court's third lost n l Hit iiiristiu tuMial .malysis deals with the issue of
fundamental fairness and the notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court found
Ihiil it wns (iiiidaiiiiiiljlly lau Co assert jurisdiction over Defendant Fletcher. The court
concluded that by personally contracting with a Utah corporation, Defendant Fletcher
is on notice and that it was foreseeable that litigation relating to that contract could be
brought in Utah. Fletcher should also have been aware that the contract would have a
significant impact in the State of Utah.
Applying the anal\ sis iisai in Hie ,Yi »i <i Mmi ub,e to this case, jurisdiction should
be found to exist. When CTCI telephoned Adler and entered into an oral contract to
perform woik m tin Slik nl < oloiudo, I "I (1 was transacting business in the State of
Utah. This is especially exhibited by the fact that after performir

f

[

requested. Ad In iilcd suit against (T( 1 for payment, in the Eighth District Court, State
of Utah and CTCI entered an appearance, agreeing 10 siihmn In I hah jurisdiction
The second Nova Mud factor is present because the Appellant was injured when
he was performing the contract between Aiiier urid i "T( "I I lius, Hit iiifiii v arose out of
the contract. Finally, the third factor is present because it is fundamentally fair for this
Court to exercise jurisdiction o< ei ( Ti 1 li w .is foieseeable io I 11 1 I hat litigation
arising out of the contract could commence and that the contract would have a significant
impact m the Srnie of I liali

I lie ififimes that Appellant sustained through performing the

contract impacted his life forever.
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CONCLUSION
Chase stepped beyond that of an ordinary lender protecting its interests and thus,
became a principal of the debtor, Landmark/Westcourt. By exercising much more
control of the assets and day-to-day operations of Landmark/Westcourt than an ordinary
lender would normally exert, Chase became a manager/owner of the refinery and should
therefore be liable for injuries caused the Appellant, due to the negligence of its
employees.
CTCI is and was present in the State of Utah through it Web site. The Web site
and the electronic communications made by CTCI constitute continual and substantial
activity within the State of Utah to find general jurisdiction exists. General jurisdiction
exists and Appellant's claim need not be related to CTCFs contacts with Utah for the
lawsuit to proceed.
Alternatively, CTCI has already been brought into Utah Courts by Adler in a
previous lawsuit and CTCI admitted jurisdiction. To argue that there is not jurisdiction
now is to argue against jurisdiction that has already been admitted in the Adler case
because the same analysis applies. The only difference is that now the Appellant of the
current lawsuit is the employee of Adler and not Adler itself. The same contract is
present and the same contacts between the parties are present.
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DATED

001.

PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER
Crescent Square #13
11075 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
801-428-1730

By: \Vi y/fUMJ,/
/neVAT
Wayne
A. Freestone
Attorney for Plaintiff
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INCLUDED IN SEPARATE BINDING
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